## CS 580: Artificial Intelligence


[These slides are mostly based on those of Dan Klein and Pieter Abbeel for CS188 Intro to AI at UC Berkeley, ai.berkeley.edu]

## Behavior from Computation


[Demo: mystery pacman (L6D1)]

## Video of Demo Mystery Pacman

## Adversarial Games



## Types of Games

- Many different kinds of games!
- Axes:
- Deterministic or stochastic?
- One, two, or more players?
- Zero sum?

- Perfect information (can you see the state)?
- Want algorithms for calculating a strategy (policy) which recommends a move from each state


## Deterministic Games

- Many possible formalizations, one is:
- States: S (start at so)
- Players: $\mathrm{P}=\{1 . . \mathrm{N}\}$ (usually take turns)
- Actions: A (may depend on player / state)
- Transition Function: SxA $\rightarrow$ S
- Terminal Test: $\mathrm{S} \rightarrow\{\mathrm{t}, \mathrm{f}\}$
- Terminal Utilities: SxP $\rightarrow R$
- Solution for a player is a policy: $\mathrm{S} \rightarrow \mathrm{A}$



## Zero-Sum Games



- Zero-Sum Games
- Agents have opposite utilities (values on outcomes)
- Lets us think of a single value that one maximizes and the other minimizes
- Adversarial, pure competition

- General Games
- Agents have independent utilities (values on outcomes)
- Cooperation, indifference, competition, and more are all possible
- More later on non-zero-sum games


## Adversarial Search



Single-Agent Trees


## Value of a State



## Adversarial Game Trees



## Minimax Values

States Under Agent's Control:
$V(s)=\max _{s^{\prime} \in \operatorname{successors}(s)} V\left(s^{\prime}\right)$

States Under Opponent's Control:

$$
V\left(s^{\prime}\right)=\min _{s \in \text { successors }\left(s^{\prime}\right)} V(s)
$$



Terminal States:
$V(s)=$ known

## Tic-Tac-Toe Game Tree



## Adversarial Search (Minimax)

- Deterministic, zero-sum games:
- Tic-tac-toe, chess, checkers
- One player maximizes result
- The other minimizes result
- Minimax search:
- A state-space search tree
- Players alternate turns
- Compute each node's minimax value: the best achievable utility against a rational (optimal) adversary


Terminal values: part of the game

## Minimax Implementation

def max-value(state):
initialize $v=-\infty$
for each successor of state:
$v=\max (v$, min-value(successor)) return $v$

$$
V(s)=\max _{s^{\prime} \in \operatorname{successors}(s)} V\left(s^{\prime}\right)
$$

def min-value(state):
initialize $v=+\infty$
for each successor of state:
$v=\min (v$, max-value(successor)) return $v$

$$
V\left(s^{\prime}\right)=\min _{s \in \operatorname{successors}\left(s^{\prime}\right)} V(s)
$$

## Minimax Implementation (Dispatch)

## def value(state):

if the state is a terminal state: return the state's utility if the next agent is MAX: return max-value(state) if the next agent is MIN: return min-value(state)
def max-value(state):
initialize $v=-\infty$
for each successor of state: $v=\max (v$, value(successor))
return $v$
def min-value(state):
initialize $v=+\infty$
for each successor of state:
$v=\min (v$, value(successor))
return $v$

## Minimax Example



## Minimax Properties



Optimal against a perfect player. Otherwise?
[Demo: min vs exp (L6D2, L6D3)]

Video of Demo Min vs. Exp (Min)

## Video of Demo Min vs. Exp (Exp)

## Minimax Efficiency

- How efficient is minimax?
- Just like (exhaustive) DFS
- Time: O(b ${ }^{m}$ )
- Space: O(bm)
- Example: For chess, $b \approx 35, m \approx 100$
- Exact solution is completely infeasible
- But, do we need to explore the whole tree?



## Resource Limits



## Game Tree Pruning



## Minimax Example



## Minimax Pruning



## Alpha-Beta Pruning

- General configuration (MIN version)
- We're computing the MIN-VALUE at some node $n$
- We're looping over n's children
- $n$ 's estimate of the childrens' min is dropping
- Who cares about n's value? MAX
- Let $a$ be the best value that MAX can get at any choice point along the current path from the root
- If $n$ becomes worse than $a, \mathrm{MAX}$ will avoid it, so we can stop considering $n$ 's other children (it's already bad enough that it won't be played)

- MAX version is symmetric


## Alpha-Beta Implementation

$\alpha$ : MAX's best option on path to root
$\beta$ : MIN's best option on path to root
def max-value(state, $\alpha, \beta$ ):
initialize $v=-\infty$
for each successor of state:
$v=\max (v$, value(successor, $\alpha, \beta)$ )
if $v \geq \beta$ return $v$
$\alpha=\max (\alpha, v)$
return $v$
def min-value(state , $\alpha, \beta$ ):
initialize $v=+\infty$
for each successor of state:
$v=\min (v$, value(successor, $\alpha, \beta))$
if $v \leq \alpha$ return $v$
$\beta=\min (\beta, v)$
return $v$

## Alpha-Beta Pruning Properties

- This pruning has no effect on minimax value computed for the root!
- Values of intermediate nodes might be wrong
- Important: children of the root may have the wrong value
- So the most naïve version won't let you do action selection
- Good child ordering improves effectiveness of pruning
- With "perfect ordering":
- Time complexity drops to $O\left(b^{m / 2}\right)$

- Doubles solvable depth!
- Full search of, e.g. chess, is still hopeless...
- This is a simple example of metareasoning (computing about what to compute)


## Alpha-Beta Quiz



Alpha-Beta Quiz 2


## Resource Limits



## Resource Limits

- Problem: In realistic games, cannot search to leaves!
- Solution: Depth-limited search
- Instead, search only to a limited depth in the tree
- Replace terminal utilities with an evaluation function for non-terminal positions
- Example:
- Suppose we have 100 seconds, can explore 10 K nodes / sec
- So can check 1 M nodes per move
- $\alpha-\beta$ reaches about depth 8 - decent chess program
- Guarantee of optimal play is gone
- More plies makes a BIG difference
- Use iterative deepening for an anytime algorithm

max
$\min$


## Video of Demo Thrashing (d=2)

[Demo: thrashing $\mathrm{d}=2$, thrashing $\mathrm{d}=2$ (fixed evaluation function) (L6D6)]

## Why Pacman Starves



- A danger of replanning agents!
- He knows his score will go up by eating the dot now (west, east)
- He knows his score will go up just as much by eating the dot later (east, west)
- There are no point-scoring opportunities after eating the dot (within the horizon, two here)
- Therefore, waiting seems just as good as eating: he may go east, then back west in the next round of replanning!


## Video of Demo Thrashing -- Fixed (d=2)

[Demo: thrashing $\mathrm{d}=2$, thrashing $\mathrm{d}=2$ (fixed evaluation function) (L6D7)]

## Evaluation Functions



## Evaluation Functions

- Evaluation functions score non-terminals in depth-limited search


Black to move
White slightly better


White to move
Black winning

- Ideal function: returns the actual minimax value of the position
- In practice: typically weighted linear sum of features:

$$
\operatorname{Eval}(s)=w_{1} f_{1}(s)+w_{2} f_{2}(s)+\ldots+w_{n} f_{n}(s)
$$

- e.g. $f_{1}(s)=$ (num white queens - num black queens), etc.


## Evaluation for Pacman


[Demo: thrashing $\mathrm{d}=2$, thrashing $\mathrm{d}=2$ (fixed evaluation function), smart ghosts coordinate (L6D6,7,8,10)]

Video of Demo Smart Ghosts (Coordination)

## Video of Demo Smart Ghosts (Coordination) - Zoomed In

## Depth Matters

- Evaluation functions are always imperfect
- The deeper in the tree the evaluation function is buried, the less the quality of the evaluation
 function matters
- An important example of the tradeoff between complexity of features and complexity of computation

[Demo: depth limited (L6D4, L6D5)]


## Video of Demo Limited Depth (2)

## Video of Demo Limited Depth (10)

## Synergies between Evaluation Function and Alpha-Beta?

- Alpha-Beta: amount of pruning depends on expansion ordering
- Evaluation function can provide guidance to expand most promising nodes first (which later makes it more likely there is already a good alternative on the path to the root)
- (somewhat similar to role of A* heuristic, CSPs filtering)
- Alpha-Beta: (similar for roles of min-max swapped)
- Value at a min-node will only keep going down
- Once value of min-node lower than better option for max along path to root, can prune
- Hence: IF evaluation function provides upper-bound on value at min-node, and upper-bound already lower than better option for max along path to root THEN can prune




## UNCERTAINTY AND UTILITIES

## Uncertain Outcomes



## Worst-Case vs. Average Case



Idea: Uncertain outcomes controlled by chance, not an adversary!

## Expectimax Search

- Why wouldn't we know what the result of an action will be?
- Explicit randomness: rolling dice
- Unpredictable opponents: the ghosts respond randomly
- Actions can fail: when moving a robot, wheels might slip
- Values should now reflect average-case (expectimax) outcomes, not worst-case (minimax) outcomes
- Expectimax search: compute the average score under optimal play
- Max nodes as in minimax search
- Chance nodes are like min nodes but the outcome is uncertain
- Calculate their expected utilities
- I.e. take weighted average (expectation) of children
- Later, we'll learn how to formalize the underlying uncertainresult problems as Markov Decision Processes


Video of Demo Minimax vs Expectimax (Min)

## Expectimax Pseudocode

## def value(state):

if the state is a terminal state: return the state's utility if the next agent is MAX: return max-value(state) if the next agent is EXP: return exp-value(state)
def max-value(state):
initialize $v=-\infty$
for each successor of state:
$\mathrm{v}=\max (\mathrm{v}$, value(successor))
return $v$

## def exp-value(state):

initialize $v=0$
for each successor of state:
$p=$ probability(successor)
v += p * value(successor)
return $v$

## Expectimax Pseudocode

```
def exp-value(state):
    initialize v = 0
    for each successor of state:
        p = probability(successor)
        v += p * value(successor)
    return v
```



$$
v=(1 / 2)(8)+(1 / 3)(24)+(1 / 6)(-12)=10
$$

## Expectimax Example



## Expectimax Pruning?



## Depth-Limited Expectimax



## Probabilities



## Reminder: Probabilities

- A random variable represents an event whose outcome is unknown
- A probability distribution is an assignment of weights to outcomes
- Example: Traffic on freeway
- Random variable: $T=$ whether there's traffic

- As we get more evidence, probabilities may change:
- $\mathrm{P}(\mathrm{T}=$ heavy $)=0.25, \mathrm{P}(\mathrm{T}=$ heavy $\mid$ Hour $=8 \mathrm{am})=0.60$
- We'll talk about methods for reasoning and updating probabilities later

0.25


## Reminder: Expectations

- The expected value of a function of a random variable is the average, weighted by the probability distribution over outcomes
- Example: How long to get to the airport?



## What Probabilities to Use?

- In expectimax search, we have a probabilistic m of how the opponent (or environment) will beh any state
- Model could be a simple uniform distribution (roll a dre)
- Model could be sophisticated and require a great deal of computation
- We have a chance node for any outcome out of our contr pl: opponent or environment
- The model might say that adversarial actions are likely!
- For now, assume each chance node magically comes along with probabilities that specify the distribution over its outcomes


Having a probabilistic belief about another agent's action does not mean that the agent is flipping any coins!

## Quiz: Informed Probabilities

- Let's say you know that your opponent is actually running a depth 2 minimax, using the result $80 \%$ of the time, and moving randomly otherwise
- Question: What tree search should you use?

- Answer: Expectimax!
- To figure out EACH chance node's probabilities, you have to run a simulation of your opponent
- This kind of thing gets very slow very quickly
- Even worse if you have to simulate your opponent simulating you...
- ... except for minimax, which has the nice property that it all collapses into one game tree


## Modeling Assumptions



## The Dangers of Optimism and Pessimism

Dangerous Optimism
Assuming chance when the world is adversarial


Dangerous Pessimism
Assuming the worst case when it's not likely


## Assumptions vs. Reality



Results from playing 5 games

Pacman used depth 4 search with an eval function that avoids trouble Ghost used depth 2 search with an eval function that seeks Pacman

## Assumptions vs. Reality



|  | Adversarial Ghost | Random Ghost |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Minimax <br> Pacman | Won 5/5 | Won 5/5 |
| Expectimax <br> Pacman | Avcore: 483 | Avg. Score: 493 |

Results from playing 5 games

Pacman used depth 4 search with an eval function that avoids trouble Ghost used depth 2 search with an eval function that seeks Pacman

Video of Demo World Assumptions
Random Ghost - Expectimax Pacman

Video of Demo World Assumptions
Adversarial Ghost - Minimax Pacman

Video of Demo World Assumptions
Adversarial Ghost - Expectimax Pacman

Video of Demo World Assumptions
Random Ghost - Minimax Pacman

## Other Game Types



## Mixed Layer Types

- E.g. Backgammon
- Expectiminimax
- Environment is an extra "random agent" player that moves after each min/max agent

- Each node computes the appropriate combination of its children


## Example: Backgammon

- Dice rolls increase $b$ : 21 possible rolls with 2 dice
- Backgammon $\approx 20$ legal moves
- Depth $2=20 \times(21 \times 20)^{3}=1.2 \times 10^{9}$
- As depth increases, probability of reaching a given search node shrinks
- So usefulness of search is diminished
- So limiting depth is less damaging

- But pruning is trickier...
- Historic AI: TDGammon uses depth-2 search + very good evaluation function + reinforcement learning: world-champion level play
- $1^{\text {st }} \mathrm{Al}$ world champion in any game!


## Multi-Agent Utilities

- What if the game is not zero-sum, or has multiple players?
- Generalization of minimax:
- Terminals have utility tuples
- Node values are also utility tuples
- Each player maximizes its own component
- Can give rise to cooperation and competition dynamically...



## Utilities



## Maximum Expected Utility

- Why should we average utilities? Why not minimax?
- Principle of maximum expected utility:
- A rational agent should chose the action that maximizes its expected utility, given its knowledge
- Questions:

- Where do utilities come from?
- How do we know such utilities even exist?
- How do we know that averaging even makes sense?
- What if our behavior (preferences) can't be described by utilities?


## What Utilities to Use?



- For worst-case minimax reasoning, terminal function scale doesn't matter
- We just want better states to have higher evaluations (get the ordering right)
- We call this insensitivity to monotonic transformations
- For average-case expectimax reasoning, we need magnitudes to be meaningful


## Utilities

- Utilities are functions from outcomes (states of the world) to real numbers that describe an agent's preferences
- Where do utilities come from?
- In a game, may be simple (+1/-1)
- Utilities summarize the agent's goals
- Theorem: any "rational" preferences can
 be summarized as a utility function
- We hard-wire utilities and let behaviors emerge
- Why don't we let agents pick utilities?
- Why don't we prescribe behaviors?


## Utilities: Uncertain Outcomes



## Preferences

- An agent must have preferences among:
- Prizes: $A, B$, etc.
- Lotteries: situations with uncertain prizes

$$
L=[p, A ;(1-p), B]
$$

- Notation:

A Prize


- Preference: $A \succ B$
- Indifference: $A \sim B$



## Rationality



## Rational Preferences

- We want some constraints on preferences before we call them rational, such as:

$$
\text { Axiom of Transitivity: }(A \succ B) \wedge(B \succ C) \Rightarrow(A \succ C)
$$

- For example: an agent with intransitive preferences can be induced to give away all of its money
- If $B>C$, then an agent with $C$ would pay (say) 1 cent to get $B$
- If $A>B$, then an agent with $B$ would pay (say) 1 cent to get $A$
- If $C>A$, then an agent with $A$ would pay (say) 1 cent to get $C$



## Rational Preferences

The Axioms of Rationality

```
Orderability
    (A\succB)\vee (B\succA)\vee (A~B)
Transitivity
    (A\succB)\wedge(B\succC)=>(A\succC)
Continuity
    A\succB\succC=>\existsp[p,A; 1-p,C]~B
Substitutability
    A~B=>[p,A;1-p,C]~[p,B;1-p,C]
Monotonicity
    A\succB=>
        ( }p\geqq\Leftrightarrow[p,A;1-p,B]\succeq[q,A;1-q,B]
```



Theorem: Rational preferences imply behavior describable as maximization of expected utility

## MEU Principle

- Theorem [Ramsey, 1931; von Neumann \& Morgenstern, 1944]
- Given any preferences satisfying these constraints, there exists a real-valued function $U$ such that:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& U(A) \geq U(B) \Leftrightarrow A \succeq B \\
& U\left(\left[p_{1}, S_{1} ; \ldots ; p_{n}, S_{n}\right]\right)=\sum_{i} p_{i} U\left(S_{i}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

- I.e. values assigned by U preserve preferences of both prizes and lotteries!

- Maximum expected utility (MEU) principle:
- Choose the action that maximizes expected utility
- Note: an agent can be entirely rational (consistent with MEU) without ever representing or manipulating utilities and probabilities
- E.g., a lookup table for perfect tic-tac-toe, a reflex vacuum cleaner


## Human Utilities



## Utility Scales

- Normalized utilities: $u_{+}=1.0, u_{-}=0.0$
- Micromorts: one-millionth chance of death, useful for paying to reduce product risks, etc.
- QALYs: quality-adjusted life years, useful for medical decisions involving substantial risk
- Note: behavior is invariant under positive linear transformation

$$
U^{\prime}(x)=k_{1} U(x)+k_{2} \quad \text { where } k_{1}>0
$$



- With deterministic prizes only (no lottery choices), only ordinal utility can be determined, i.e., total order on prizes


## Human Utilities

- Utilities map states to real numbers. Which numbers?
- Standard approach to assessment (elicitation) of human utilities:
- Compare a prize A to a standard lottery $L_{p}$ between
- "best possible prize" $u_{+}$with probability $p$
- "worst possible catastrophe" u. with probability 1-p
- Adjust lottery probability $p$ until indifference: $A \sim L_{p}$

- Resulting $p$ is a utility in $[0,1]$



## Money

- Money does not behave as a utility function, but we can talk about the utility of having money (or being in debt)
- Given a lottery L = [p, \$X; (1-p), \$Y]
- The expected monetary value $E M V(L)$ is $p^{*} X+(1-p)^{*} Y$
- $\mathrm{U}(\mathrm{L})=\mathrm{p}^{*} \mathrm{U}(\$ \mathrm{X})+(1-\mathrm{p})^{*} \mathrm{U}(\$ \mathrm{Y})$
- Typically, $\mathrm{U}(\mathrm{L})<\mathrm{U}(\mathrm{EMV}(\mathrm{L}))$
- In this sense, people are risk-averse
- When deep in debt, people are risk-prone




## Example: Insurance

- Consider the lottery [0.5, \$1000; $0.5, \$ 0]$
- What is its expected monetary value? (\$500)
- What is its certainty equivalent?
- Monetary value acceptable in lieu of lottery
- \$400 for most people
- Difference of $\$ 100$ is the insurance premium
- There's an insurance industry because people will pay to reduce their risk
- If everyone were risk-neutral, no insurance needed!
- It's win-win: you'd rather have the $\$ 400$ and
 the insurance company would rather have the lottery (their utility curve is flat and they have many lotteries)


## Example: Human Rationality?

- Famous example of Allais (1953)
- A: [0.8, \$4k; 0.2, \$0] ৫
- B: [1.0, \$3k; 0.0, \$0]
- C: [0.2, \$4k; 0.8, \$0]
- D: [0.25, \$3k; 0.75, \$0]
- Most people prefer B > A, C > D
- But if $U(\$ 0)=0$, then
- $\mathrm{B}>\mathrm{A} \Rightarrow \mathrm{U}(\$ 3 \mathrm{k})>0.8 \mathrm{U}(\$ 4 \mathrm{k})$
- $\mathrm{C}>\mathrm{D} \Rightarrow 0.8 \mathrm{U}(\$ 4 \mathrm{k})>\mathrm{U}(\$ 3 \mathrm{k})$


